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THE TECH GIANTS, MONOPOLY POWER, AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

In November 2019, the Knight First Amendment 
Institute convened a major symposium at Columbia 
University, titled “The Tech Giants, Monopoly Power, 
and Public Discourse,” to address concerns arising 
from the dominance of a small number of technology 
companies over a wide range of economic and 
expressive activity. The essays in this series were 
originally presented and discussed at this two-day 
event. Written by scholars and experts in law, computer 
science, economics, information studies, journalism, 
political science, and other disciplines, the essays 
focus on two questions: how and to what extent the 
technology giants’ power is shaping public discourse, 
and whether anti-monopoly tools might usefully be 
deployed to expose or counter this power. 
The symposium was conceptualized by Knight Institute 
staff, including Jameel Jaffer, Executive Director; Katy 
Glenn Bass, Research Director; Alex Abdo, Litigation 
Director; and Larry Siems, Chief of Staff. The essay 
series was edited by Glenn Bass with additional 
support from Lorraine Kenny, Communications 
Director; Sarah Guinee, Research Fellow; and Madeline 
Wood, Communications and Research Coordinator. 
The full series is available at knightcolumbia.org/research/
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INTRODUCTION
The ability of a concentrated few to shape the speech environment has waxed and waned throughout history. The printing press exploded elite control over ideas, leading to revolution, conflict, 
and an unprecedented sustained increase in living standards (sometimes 
called “the Great Enrichment”). More recently, powerful publishers and 
broadcasters lost their gatekeeper role in the eruption of communications 
facilitated by internet platforms. As a result, the average person today pos-
sesses an ability and freedom to speak to a broad audience that is unparal-
leled in human history. 
This freedom can and has been abused, and thus platforms face political 
and market pressure to control the speech on their services. People across 
the political spectrum accuse platforms of fostering hate, censoring speech, 
and harming journalism. Based on largely instinctual assessments that plat-
forms face little competitive pressure on how they govern speech, some have 
sought to expand antitrust enforcers’ mandate beyond competition values.
Many question whether and to what degree large platforms are guilty of 
the accused harms. We touch on this debate. But our primary method is to 
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assume such harms are serious and examine the proposed solutions. 
Our conclusion: If private platform power over the speech environment 
is a problem, antitrust is the wrong solution. Competition can promote 
consumers’ free speech preferences. However, increasing the number of 
competitors will not help because current free speech concerns are not 
caused by a lack of competition. In fact, unleashing antitrust regulators to 
pursue non-competition-related goals would threaten free speech values. 
Removing key constraints on antitrust’s powerful tools—tools with a history 
of abusive and arbitrary use—would weaken antitrust’s ability to protect the 
competitive process and increase the risk that governments and others will 
abuse such tools to interfere with speech.
EVERYBODY HATES MARK ZUCKERBERG—
BUT CAN’T AGREE WHY 
People of diverse political views worry that popular internet platforms for user-contributed content such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are harming free speech and even disrupting democ-
racy in the United States and around the world. Many, especially on the 
right, fear that these companies exhibit biases in choosing what content to 
suppress or promote. On the left, many believe that these platforms facili-
tate hate and normalize extremism. Both fear that these online platforms 
hold outsized power over public discourse because so much speech flows 
through them.
The Supreme Court has expanded protection of free speech against 
government interference over the last several decades. But despite greater 
free speech protections in the traditional (government-owned) public square, 
some fear that the increasing prevalence of social media platforms will 
actually threaten free expression because these private companies, unlike 
the government, are not subject to the constraints of the First Amendment. 
Indeed, social media platforms—like any private person—have First Amend-
ment rights against government interference with their content decisions. 
Efforts by Prager University and others to try to impose the restraints of 
the First Amendment on YouTube, Twitter, and other platforms in their 
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relationships with their users have thus far failed.1 But in the absence of any 
clear legal standards on the free speech rights of social media platform users 
vis-à-vis the platforms’ own content decisions, debates about online speech 
are nevertheless shaped by notions of viewpoint neutrality and speaker 
discrimination in First Amendment law. 
Many pundits, politicians, and individuals generally aligned with the 
Republican Party believe that online platforms are suppressing conservative 
speech online.2 Republican senators Ted Cruz and Josh Hawley, for example, 
assert that online-platform companies prevent conservatives from express-
ing and spreading their views. In a petition to the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), Cruz and Hawley complained that “never before in this country have 
so few people controlled so much speech” and demanded that the agency 
should investigate tech companies’ business and moderation practices.3 
Hawley’s fears have motivated him to legislative action: He introduced 
the Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act with the intent of remov-
ing liability protections from online platforms that moderate content with 
non-neutral standards.4 
Other prominent Republicans, including President Donald Trump, 
media host Laura Ingraham, and campus antisocialism provocateur Char-
lie Kirk, contend that platform company employees and policies are biased 
against conservative viewpoints.5 They point to incidents like the suspension 
of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s Twitter account or leaked inter-
nal emails at Google that suggest Google employees have strong liberal—or 
rather, anticonservative—leanings. Pew Research Center surveys also indi-
cate that individuals aligned with conservative ideologies believe that social 
media companies favor liberal ideas over conservative views.6 
The companies are well aware of the right-of-center concerns. After the 
Susan B. Anthony List, a pro-life group, complained that Facebook took 
down several of its videos about abortion, the company eventually apolo-
gized and restored the videos to their site.7 Conservative groups and individ-
uals also criticize online platforms for relying on left-leaning organizations 
to help them set policies for their services. For example, Amazon relies 
on the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a progressive public-interest 
advocacy and legal organization, to prevent charities from participating in 
AmazonSmile, its charitable contribution program. When the SPLC labeled 
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the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF), a religious liberty law firm, a “hate 
group,” Amazon did not allow individuals to donate to ADF through its 
online platform.8 Facebook recently released a detailed report compiled on 
its behalf by a law firm that catalogs the bias concerns of 133 conservative 
organizations, individuals, and lawmakers.9 And as Mark Zuckerberg himself 
noted in a Washington Post op-ed, “Lawmakers often tell me we have too 
much power over speech, and I agree.”10
But concerns about online speech are a rare opportunity for biparti-
sanship today. Left-leaning organizations and individuals also worry about 
platforms’ roles in speech. It’s only a bit oversimplified to summarize right-
of-center concerns as “platforms take down too much of our content” and 
left-of-center concerns as “platforms don’t take down enough right-of-center 
content.” To be sure, some left-of-center groups argue that the platforms 
favor and protect controversial right-wing views while deleting or disfavoring 
controversial left-wing views. They compare takedowns of conservative con-
tent versus their own or aligned content and accuse the platforms of uneven 
moderation actions.11 Some claim that content moderation by online plat-
forms disproportionately affects racial and ethnic minorities.12  For example, 
some note that Facebook allowed a congressman to advocate the murder of 
“extremist Muslims,” yet it deactivated a Black Lives Matter activist’s account 
for calling white people racist.13 Other groups, including Palestinian media 
outlets and activist organizations working in conflict regions, have received 
moderation warnings or account deactivations based on Facebook’s content 
policies.14 These examples of moderation decisions against left-of-center 
voices are not well known to right-of-center audiences, exacerbating the 
perception that all moderation decisions are against right-of-center voices.
Others appear less concerned with the specific outcomes of such deci-
sions than with the fact that the power to make those decisions sits in private 
hands. While many on the political left want social media companies to regu-
late the types of messages shared on social media platforms, they also share 
conservatives’ concerns about the influence and power of large social media 
platforms over users’ ability to express themselves. Chris Hughes, a Facebook 
co-founder, protests thus: “The most problematic aspect of Facebook’s power 
is Mark [Zuckerberg]’s unilateral control over speech. There is no precedent 
for his ability to monitor, organize and even censor the conversations of two 
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billion people.”15 Zephyr Teachout and Lina Khan claim that corporations 
can exert greater political influence due to their large size and permissive 
reforms in campaign finance laws.16 Separately, Teachout has argued that 
online platforms, especially social media companies, reduce the number of 
local newspapers and “really good news” sources and enable the spread of 
propaganda.17 Larry Kramer, a constitutional law scholar, likewise frets that 
social media platforms make it too easy for “the really awful information” to 
reach the general public.18 
Senator Elizabeth Warren has attacked social media companies for 
wielding too much influence due to their large size and has retrospectively 
criticized mergers between online platforms like Instagram and Facebook 
as harmful to competition and society.19 She has argued that the large size 
of social media companies enables them to censor speech and spread lies 
and misinformation. After Facebook removed several of her campaign ads 
last March, Warren tweeted: 
Curious why I think FB has too much power? Let’s start with their ability to 
shut down a debate over whether FB has too much power. ... I want a social 
media marketplace that isn’t dominated by a single censor.20
Demonstrating the bipartisan nature of these concerns, Senator Ted Cruz 
retweeted Warren, adding “she’s right—Big Tech has way too much power 
to silence Free Speech.”21
YET IT HAS NEVER BEEN EASIER FOR AN 
INDIVIDUAL TO SPEAK TO A BROAD AUDIENCE
Ironically, the very platforms accused of stifling speech are the ones making it easier today than ever before for individuals to speak to a large, even global audience. Facebook, Twitter, Google, and others 
in the crosshairs of the antitrust crusaders have weakened the ability of a 
concentrated few to control ideas. Steve Yelvington argues that the inter-
net has shifted the ability to create and distribute information away from 
institutions such as traditional media companies and toward the general 
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public.22 Large publishers and broadcasters have seen their gatekeeper role 
undermined with the development of internet-powered communications. 
New technologies and innovations allow individuals to fill the roles tradi-
tionally held by publishers and journalists as they can instantaneously film, 
photograph, and describe events with mobile devices and online platforms. 
Today, individuals can and have built international followings, and many 
make a living speaking online—whether through Instagram accounts, gam-
ing streams, monetized YouTube videos, podcasts, or subscription email lists. 
It has never been easier for one person, anywhere, to test his or her ideas in 
the global marketplace.
In countries with authoritarian regimes, social media and new types 
of information technology threaten these governments’ long-standing con-
trol over information and their societies. Citizens living under repressive 
regimes, including those in Iran, China, and Egypt, have used the internet 
and online platforms to organize protests against oppressive policies and 
unfair elections.23 Even more democratic and liberal governments show an 
aversion to allowing new forms of communication when it threatens their 
domestic industries and cultural traditions. Farhad Manjoo, a columnist for 
The New York Times, argues that European governments fear the new outlets 
for entertainment, news, and communication provided by American tech-
nology companies because of the challenges they face in controlling them.24 
The democratization of speech and the disruption of the traditional 
media gatekeeper role may also disproportionately undermine incumbent 
politicians. The “incumbency effect” is well understood, with the resources 
of incumbency and traditional media coverage of incumbents giving them 
a leg up against challengers. But research indicates that direct access of 
political challengers to masses of voters through social media platforms 
may reduce incumbents’ advantages.25 In nondemocratic states like Egypt, 
social media platforms may have played an even larger role in disrupting 
established political authorities. 
U.S. conservatives have long complained that mainstream media sources 
are biased against them. If true, one might expect that the democratizing 
influence of social media platforms would give a greater voice to conservative 
speakers. And indeed, despite the litany of conservative complaints about 
platform bias, the current evidence suggests that conservative ideas have 
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found their voice on online platforms. An NBC survey of the most popular 
authors on Facebook in February 2018 showed that out of the ten most 
popular online authors, six held and published conservative viewpoints.26 
Donald Trump himself stated that “the fact that I have such power in terms 
of numbers with Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc., I think it helped me win 
all of these races where they’re spending much more money than I spent.”27 
And some conservative outlets have had outsized influence on social media 
compared to major media outlets. For example, in the last quarter of 2019, 
Breitbart’s Facebook page, despite having one-eighth the following of CNN, 
“racked up more likes, comments, and shares ... (57.8 million) than The New 
York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and USA Today combined 
(42.6 million)” and “outpaced each of the broadcast news networks, MSNBC, 
and CNN.”28
But it is not just conservative voices that have found an outlet online. 
Social media has fostered political movements ranging from the nascent to 
the national to the international. The Black Lives Matter movement, #MeToo, 
and the Parkland kids’ gun control movement all originated online and grew 
through social media. Other examples of social media-driven movements 
include the Arab Spring uprisings as well as the recent Hong Kong protests. 
Social media also empowers more than just political change. Social 
media platforms increase access to information in critical situations, allow 
people to raise money for local causes, and empower entrepreneurs. They 
also help us stay connected to extended family and friends, find help, and 
do our jobs.29 Social media is not just cat videos and memes.
If it is so easy for individuals to speak online today, why are people 
accusing the platforms of stifling speech? It is worth considering the motives 
of the disrupted incumbent gatekeepers. Antitrust scholar Ramsi Woodcock 
has argued that writers and reporters see certain big tech companies as a 
competitive threat, and their reporting is “colored by writers’ sense of pro-
fessional vulnerability to the tech giants.”30 No surprise, then, that over “the 
first seven months of 2019, the [New York] Times published more than 300 
articles mentioning Google, Facebook, or Amazon and antitrust, including 
an Op-Ed by a Facebook founder calling for breakup, an article discussing 
legal changes required to ‘take down big tech,’ and another musing on what 
Amazon will do once its ‘domination is complete.’”31 In this environment, 
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politicians, including senators and state attorneys general, have benefited 
greatly from attacking big tech because, as Woodcock notes, “while [the 
press] may not be as well financed as Amazon, Google, or Facebook, writers 
can offer their friends something more valuable than money: publicity.”32 
And these criticisms of big tech are not limited to the news pages. The News 
Media Alliance, which represents a large coalition of newspapers, has called 
for legislative changes to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
which would impose significant costs on online platforms.33 Meanwhile, 
the same group is also seeking government help to compete with big tech 
companies—and gaining traction. House Judiciary Committee Chairman 
David Cicilline, who is leading a congressional antitrust investigation into big 
tech, has co-sponsored legislation favored by the News Media Alliance that 
would create an antitrust exemption permitting news outlets to form a cartel 
to negotiate with online advertising companies like Google and Facebook.34 
Still, while the mainstream press may be less than objective on the topic 
of internet platforms, it is obvious that this expansion of speech online is not 
problem-free. Online, as in real life, people do not always exercise freedom 
responsibly. Because social media provides easy access to large audiences, 
individuals with extreme and even hateful and dangerous views can find 
each other online and reinforce each other’s viewpoints. Online anonymity 
and pseudo-anonymity protect some from the real-life consequences of their 
uncivil or abusive behavior. In past mass media environments, gatekeeper 
publishers and broadcasters limited the ability of fringe perspectives to 
break through to an audience. Those gatekeepers screened material so that 
it would appeal to a broad audience. This meant that innovative new ideas 
faced barriers to reaching a national audience, but so too did ideas that large 
numbers of people found offensive or abhorrent. The internet has routed 
around those gatekeepers and added novel methods to continue humani-
ty’s long streak of some people being terrible to others—only now, horrible 
behavior can go viral in ways that many others can see. 
In short, the internet is a very large mirror reflecting a wide swath of 
human behavior, and we do not like everything we see.
10 KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE
THE PROBLEM ISN’T A LACK OF COMPETITION 
So, people disagree greatly on exactly how speech problems manifest on platforms. Bias on the left or on the right? Too much moderation or too little? Yet no matter what speech concerns people 
have, a growing number argue that antitrust enforcement would help. They 
disagree over the nature of the problem but seem to agree that platforms lack 
competition and believe that increasing competition would help address the 
free speech problems they worry about. But while competition can promote 
free expression, the specific problems people worry about are not caused 
by a lack of competition—therefore, increasing the number of competitors 
is unlikely to address these problems.
Competition Can Help Protect Non-Market Values 
Such as Free Expression—But Not Every Speech
Problem Is a Competition Problem
The focus on competition as a remedy is based on a sound premise: Com-
petition can indeed help protect free expression. Competition incentivizes 
companies to deliver what consumers want, including whatever environ-
ments for expression they prefer. But consumers do not get everything they 
want even under vigorous competition, so the fact that some consumers are 
dissatisfied does not mean that the market lacks competition.
People typically think of competition as delivering reduced prices. But 
price is one of many different characteristics that influence consumer choices. 
Other important characteristics include quality, brand, color, source (“Louis 
Vuitton” or “Made in USA”), and manufacturing process (“made from recy-
cled materials”). Consumers also consider socially desirable attributes of 
a product, such as fair-trade coffee or conflict-free diamonds. Companies 
compete to make the product with the bundle of characteristics that most 
appeals to consumers while still generating a profit for the company.
Free expression, as reflected in moderation policies and practices, is 
one characteristic of platforms that many consumers certainly care about. 
As such, we would expect competition to drive companies to invest in and 
experiment with moderation models and techniques to satisfy these con-
sumers. Indeed, we do see examples of platforms trying different moderation 
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approaches and evolving their approaches over time.35
But while competition can spur companies to deliver what consumers 
want, including platform practices that protect free expression, the absence 
of any “perfect” set of practices does not prove that the market lacks com-
petition or that there is an antitrust violation. The fact that consumers do 
not get exactly what they say they want from the market with respect to free 
expression does not mean the market has failed or lacks competition. In 
fact, few consumers get exactly what they want in any context. Many of the 
characteristics that consumers typically desire conflict with each other: price 
and quality; quality and source; convenience and environmental impact, to 
give just three examples. Given these tradeoffs, consumers search for the 
product or service with the bundle of characteristics that best meets their 
preferences. Different consumers can have widely varying, even conflicting 
preferences. Companies compete to meet these preferences, but in a world 
of limited resources they can never fully satisfy all the preferences of every 
consumer. Consumers will often buy a slightly improved version of the 
existing product, even if the improvement is simply a lower price. Indeed, if 
a product or service existed that perfectly satisfied every consumer’s needs 
and wants, there would be no need for competition.
Thus, if the platform marketplace today lacks any certain set of platform 
moderation practices, this probably is not caused by a lack of competition. 
There are many other more plausible causes. It could be that creating that 
set of moderation practices imposes tradeoffs on price or convenience that 
no consumer would want. It could be that no one has developed the right 
technology or business model to effectively deliver that set of practices.
Or—and this seems extremely likely—it could be that the set of mod-
eration practices that most appeals to one group of consumers completely 
alienates another group of consumers. Indeed, as discussed above, people 
on the left and the right have diametrically opposed complaints about the 
platforms. It appears impossible for any platform to adopt a moderation 
policy (or even a policy of no moderation) that would fully satisfy all groups. 
It would be like trying to make a single carbonated beverage that satisfies 
both diehard Coke and diehard Pepsi fans—impossible, because they simply 
want different things. We would not claim that a market lacks competition 
because it has not produced the universally appealing soda. Likewise, we 
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should not blame a lack of competition for not producing a platform with 
ideal content moderation practices, whatever those may be. 
The market quest for the perfect platform is further complicated because 
many consumers demand not only a platform with their preferred content 
moderation policies, but also that this platform have broad appeal. Loosely 
moderated platforms like Gab exist. But many of those seeking greater free 
speech protection online want their freedom of expression to come with a 
mainstream platform with access to a large and diverse userbase. They want 
Coke instead of Pepsi, but they want Pepsi drinkers to drink Coke too. 
Breaking Up Companies Won’t Mitigate Extremism 
or Reduce Bias
Because our current content moderation problems are not caused by a lack 
of competition, increasing competition through antitrust enforcement or 
other means is unlikely to improve the situation. Indeed, forcibly increasing 
the number of competitors may not address free speech problems and could 
exacerbate them.
For those concerned with platforms’ role in distributing harmful content, 
a mere increase in the number of platforms is unlikely to reduce the total 
amount of harmful content. If new platform competitors arise or are created 
through antitrust enforcement, individuals who want to say vile things will 
have more options of places to say them. 
Some might argue that new competitors would adopt different moder-
ation policies and create a greater variety of “safe” places. But is the goal to 
create spaces where it is safe to say awful things? It seems unlikely that many 
of those concerned with objectionable content online would be satisfied if 
that content were left online but was simply less visible to them. Furthermore, 
creating smaller platforms that appeal to narrow groups could further push 
the most hateful and vile to specialized platforms that would reinforce their 
tendencies rather than temper them.36 Services like 8chan demonstrate the 
potential toxicity of small platforms. For those who want platforms to adopt 
their preferred moderation policies, wouldn’t it be easier to convince or 
coerce a few large platforms rather than many smaller platforms? And given 
the difficulty and cost involved in moderating user-generated content, larger 
platforms may be more able to effectively curb harmful content. 
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Breaking up social media services could also reduce their total value. 
Each additional user on a social media site increases the value of the site, 
certainly to advertisers but also to users who seek to maximize the potential 
audience for their speech. This phenomenon, known as a network effect, 
means that many smaller platforms would not deliver the same total value 
as a few larger platforms. 
Additionally, the largest platforms are now American-based, attentive to 
some degree to American concerns about and understanding of free expres-
sion. But breaking up these platforms could facilitate the rise of platforms 
based in China (like TikTok), which would raise all sorts of policy concerns, 
not least ones about free expression.37 
Nor is breaking up companies likely to address concerns about platform 
bias. Even if more vigorous or novel forms of antitrust enforcement increased 
the number of competing speech platforms, it may not increase the vibrance 
or variety of speech online. Indeed, it could force us into siloes of common 
opinion, diminishing viewpoint diversity on any one platform. As anyone 
who has spent time on modern social media platforms can attest, compe-
tition between ideas—often exemplified by interaction and debate—can 
happen within a single platform. This isn’t always the case: Filter bubbles 
can form, and it is possible to choose friends or follows so that one shields 
oneself from any difference of opinion. But, in general, larger platforms pro-
vide more opportunity for exposure to and dialogue with a greater range of 
viewpoints. In fact, “[c]ontrary to popular belief, we now hear more diverse 
voices than ever before—studies suggest that most people do not live in 
Facebook or Twitter echo chambers and ‘filter bubbles.’”38 
Some argue that the threat of consumers leaving and going to a differ-
ent platform would help temper platforms’ content practices, and that this 
threat is more plausible when there are more competing platforms.39 But 
the literature on network effects (defined above) suggests that breaking up 
platforms would have little effect on platform bias. Markets with network 
effects tend to be characterized by competition for the market, rather than 
competition in the market. The platform that already has the most users will 
attract the greatest number of new users, creating a snowballing “winner 
takes all” dynamic. As such, in the fight to compete for the market, platforms 
face competitive pressure to adopt moderation policies that appeal to (or at 
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least do not offend) the most potential users. Thus, even if antitrust enforcers 
forced more platform choices into the marketplace, those new choices will all 
face incentives to appeal as widely to their market as possible, which could 
result in similar moderation policies across competing platforms—and no 
increased variety in speech. 
There are several other reasons that inflating the number of competitors 
through antitrust may not improve the robustness of speech online. Creating 
competitors won’t change the desire of certain people to speak to the largest 
possible audience. More specialized, smaller platforms are less attractive 
to attention-seekers who want to communicate a message to the broad-
est possible audience. Network effects mean that such attention-seekers 
will generally prefer the largest platforms irrespective of their moderation 
policies. And breaking up companies is unlikely to satiate those who want 
platforms to change their moderation policies. Even if platforms were smaller 
than they are today, the biggest platforms will almost certainly continue to 
face pressure about their moderation policies from diverse interest groups.
CURRENT ANTITRUST LAW DOES NOT PERMIT 
BREAKING UP COMPANIES BASED ON 
FREE SPEECH CONCERNS
Even though increasing the number of competitors is unlikely to fix online bias or extremism, that hasn’t stopped people from trying. Indeed, many of those who are concerned about free speech 
online want to use antitrust law to address these problems. There are two 
rough categories of proposals to use antitrust to address speech problems. 
In this section we discuss proposals to use current antitrust law to break up 
tech companies and thereby create more competition. In the next section we 
discuss proposals to change current antitrust law to address speech prob-
lems. We also briefly mention a third, non-antitrust approach that would use 
regulation to try to generate competition. 
Many propose using existing antitrust law to “break up” companies, 
which they believe would create more competition and thereby benefit 
freedom of speech and online expression. These types of proposals tend to 
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be the vaguest of the three categories. They focus on the size of the largest 
platform companies and their market shares but do not articulate which spe-
cific company practices are anticompetitive under the law or how antitrust 
enforcement would improve freedom of expression. 
This type of proposal is particularly prevalent among Republican poli-
ticians and regulators.40 For example, Senator Cruz argues that Facebook’s 
large size and its alleged censorship of political speech makes it a potential 
target for antitrust regulators.41 In a recent speech, Makan Delrahim, the 
assistant attorney general responsible for overseeing the antitrust division 
of the Department of Justice, indicated that a lack of competition in the dig-
ital economy could restrict free speech online.42 Indeed, a DOJ task force is 
investigating “the widespread concerns that consumers, businesses, and 
entrepreneurs have expressed about search, social media, and some retail 
services online.”43 
Democrats have similar proposals. Typical of these proposals is Chris 
Hughes’s assertion that Facebook faces “no competition” and therefore is 
held unaccountable for its bad behavior.44 He argues that government offi-
cials should use antitrust to break up large technology companies and then 
empower regulators to set standards and rules for social media speech.45 
Robert Reich, U.S. Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration, has said, 
“Antitrust should be used against Facebook and Twitter. They should be bro-
ken up” so that “the public will have more diverse sources of information.”46 
Despite the bipartisan urge to use antitrust to address free speech con-
cerns, current antitrust law likely does not support breaking up tech plat-
forms based solely on the free speech concerns discussed above. Supporters 
of these proposals informally frame the antitrust violations as monopoliza-
tion or attempted monopolization cases. But being a large company with a 
high market share—or even being a monopoly—does not violate antitrust 
law. Antitrust law has rejected the simplistic conclusion that “big” is inher-
ently “bad” because that approach was harmful to consumers and arbitrary 
in application. 
Size and market share can indicate market power (the ability to increase 
price or reduce quality without losing market share), but they can also signal 
a competitor who succeeded by better meeting consumer demands. Prior 
to the 1980s courts primarily focused on the size of companies in antitrust 
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cases, and as a result they frequently punished efficient companies that 
grew large by outcompeting their competitors to give consumers what they 
wanted. As economists have demonstrated (and experience has confirmed), 
larger companies can generate significant benefits, such as efficiencies of 
scale that enable lower prices. Antitrust enforcement focused on size alone 
often punished companies that served consumers better. 
Although size or market share would seem to be a relatively objective 
test, antitrust enforcement before the 1980s was also surprisingly arbitrary. 
Sometimes a company’s purportedly threatening size was puzzlingly small. 
For example, in the famous Brown Shoe v. United States case, the defen-
dant company held approximately 7 percent of the national shoe market.47 
Aggrieved competitors also frequently weaponized antitrust to protect them-
selves from competition.48 The focus on size rather than conduct produced a 
body of cases so arbitrary that Justice Potter Stewart said the only consistency 
he could see was that “the Government always wins.”49 
Because of these flaws, courts in the late 1970s and into the 1980s turned 
away from a “big is bad” approach and toward more sophisticated analyses 
to identify harmful conduct. Courts adopted many procedural and substan-
tive tools that determine whether a business practice is anticompetitive by its 
ultimate effects on consumers. This so-called “consumer welfare standard” 
recognized that consumers often can benefit from large companies.
As a result, market power—even monopoly power—by itself is not a 
violation of the antitrust laws. To succeed on a monopoly claim today, one 
must first define the relevant product and geographic markets and demon-
strate that the accused company has power in those markets. But even if 
the accused company has a 100 percent share of the defined market, that 
alone is not sufficient to violate the antitrust law. The company must also 
engage in some specific exclusionary conduct that is helping the company 
obtain or maintain its monopoly. Exclusionary conduct is that which impairs 
the opportunities of rivals while not furthering competition on the merits. 
Examples include inducing a boycott of competitors, refusing to make certain 
deals, and engaging in predatory pricing.
Those who would use existing antitrust law to protect free expression 
have not defined the relevant product and geographical markets that apply 
to platforms. Nor have they shown that any accused company has significant 
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market power in such a defined market. 
But most importantly, they have not demonstrated that companies have 
engaged in exclusionary conduct to obtain or maintain that market power. 
Content moderation practices do not constitute exclusionary conduct suffi-
cient to establish a monopolization claim. Such practices are internal to the 
company and not directed at competitors. Moderation practices do not make 
it more difficult for competitors to enter the market. Given the historical lack 
of transparency around moderation practices, it would be hard to argue that 
any of the major platforms gained or maintain their current market share 
through their choice of moderation practices. Selecting any specific moder-
ation practice is unlikely to disadvantage a competitor. Furthermore, even 
if certain moderation practices harm some consumers, they often benefit 
many others. Those who would bring an antitrust case against the platforms 
will not be able to point to moderation practices as exclusionary conduct.
Platforms may be engaged in conduct other than content moderation 
practices that exclude competition, harming rivals and consumers. If so, it 
may be appropriate to bring a monopolization case under current antitrust 
law to address that conduct. But those who allege that platforms’ activities 
are anticompetitive will have to base their case on something other than 
content moderation practices—at least under existing antitrust law.
CHANGING ANTITRUST LAW’S RELIANCE ON 
THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD COULD 
UNDERMINE FREE SPEECH VALUES
A second category of proposals tacitly acknowledges that current antitrust law is not well suited to tackle free expression concerns. These proposals argue that the law’s emphasis on consumer wel-
fare overly constrains the scope of antitrust. They would revise the law to 
empower antitrust to address broad concerns, including concerns about 
free expression. Such proposals range from changing the way antitrust law 
measures consumer welfare to expanding antitrust enforcement to prioritize 
political considerations over consumer welfare. 
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The Consumer Welfare Standard Is the Core of 
Modern Antitrust
Antitrust’s consumer welfare standard is often misunderstood and misrepre-
sented. Examining some critics of existing antitrust enforcement, one could 
get the impression that they want to repeal the consumer welfare standard 
(CWS) as if it is a regulation or statutory text. But as one recent comment to 
the FTC explained,
[T]here is confusion about what the CWS is and what it is not. It is not a 
particular legal doctrine that is to be applied strictly in every situation and 
which, in itself, leads to particular results. It is a bundle of analytical tools 
and doctrines—subject to revision as new circumstances develop—that 
all point toward a common goal: increasing the welfare of consumers. 
These tools include standing/injury requirements, conduct requirements, 
effects analysis, burdens of proof, market definition requirements, and, ... 
presumptions.50
Thus, the consumer welfare standard is the name for the courts’ deci-
sion that, when deciding whether business conduct is anticompetitive, the 
arguments will focus on whether the result of the conduct is good or bad for 
consumers. Antitrust expert Herbert Hovenkamp describes the consumer 
welfare standard as seeking to “encourage markets to produce output as high 
as is consistent with sustainable competition, and prices that are accordingly 
as low,” a goal that aligns with consumer interests while running contrary 
to the interests of cartels or less competitive firms that need high prices to 
survive.51
Antitrust did not always have this singular goal. Judges, plaintiffs, practi-
tioners, and academics developed it over decades of experience and learning. 
As both supporters and critics of the consumer welfare standard note, early 
antitrust regulators often sought to promote competition but frequently had 
an overt political intent to rein in powerful companies or to pick winners and 
losers in the marketplace. Terse, vague statutes gave very broad authority to 
enforcers, but courts struggled with how to judge what were “unfair methods 
of competition” or how to make sense of a statute that prohibited “every 
contract ... in restraint of trade,” for example. Courts began to grapple with 
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why certain conduct was harmful but other conduct was not. In some early 
cases courts appeared to protect the competitive process. In others, it’s more 
accurate to say they protected certain companies from competition. 
In short, early antitrust had multiple, conflicting goals, including limit-
ing political power, protecting smaller competitors, and increasing consumer 
welfare.52 The statutes offered no principled way to balance these conflicting 
goals. The result: arbitrary, unpredictable, and often politicized enforcement. 
The consumer welfare standard gave coherence to this shapeless assertion 
of government authority and clarified a goal that nearly everyone agrees is 
important, even if some think other goals are more important. Rather than 
try to balance various conflicting goals, courts could focus on one goal and 
hear arguments from each side about how that goal was or was not furthered. 
The consumer welfare standard has other benefits, too. Consumer wel-
fare is a more justiciable standard than political power, for example: While 
consumer welfare can be challenging to measure, it remains far easier to 
quantify and compare than political power, which depends not only on the 
company at issue but also on the political orientations of the current govern-
ment leadership. The consumer welfare standard also avoids the complexity 
of balancing many different interests: As FTC Commissioner Christine S. 
Wilson has said, “If consumers are harmed by reduced output, decreased 
product quality, or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power, 
then this result trumps any amount of offsetting gains to producers or oth-
ers.”53 And, unlike protecting smaller competitors, the consumer welfare 
standard better incentivizes overall economic efficiency. 
The consumer welfare standard clarified the goal of antitrust, but that 
does not mean the law is static. For decades the goal of increased consumer 
welfare has been established in law and practice by experts across the polit-
ical spectrum. But there remains a healthy and productive debate about how 
to achieve that goal in any specific case. Antitrust practitioners, academics, 
and advocates frequently and vigorously debate how to apply the legal, 
economic, and policy tools of antitrust. And antitrust has been able to incor-
porate new economic evidence and arguments developed by researchers 
and academics.
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Proposals to Expand the Definition of Consumer 
Welfare to Address Free Speech Values Are 
Underdeveloped
Some recent proposals would expand the definition of consumer welfare to 
include certain free speech values. These proposals are not fully developed 
and lack empirical evidence. 
For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argues for “an 
updated consumer welfare standard that recognizes censorship as a cogniza-
ble harm to consumer welfare, and therefore an indicator of anticompetitive 
effects of digital platform market power.”54 According to EFF, online plat-
forms’ free-of-charge advertising-based business models mean that “price 
cannot be the sole metric for evaluating conduct by internet platforms.”55 
Chris Hughes similarly criticizes antitrust for its “narrow reliance on whether 
or not consumers have experienced price gouging” and argues that enforcers 
should also evaluate other effects of mergers and business conduct, such as 
reduced innovation.56
However, EFF and Hughes are attacking a strawman version of the 
consumer welfare standard. In antitrust cases, raising prices is a commonly 
alleged anticompetitive effect and can be very persuasive when demon-
strated. But antitrust also considers non-price effects of business conduct. 
As the government’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines state, “Enhanced mar-
ket power can also be manifested in non-price terms and conditions that 
adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced 
product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation.”57 Even when 
prices are the core effect being alleged, they are often quality-adjusted pric-
es.58 And some of the biggest antitrust cases—including the cases against 
AT&T, IBM, and Microsoft—alleged reduced innovation as a core part of each 
case. Indeed, “[b]etween 2004 and 2014, the FTC challenged 164 mergers and 
alleged harm to innovation in 54 of them.”59
EFF nominally acknowledges that the consumer welfare standard 
“also recognizes harms to innovation and product quality” but still claims 
that “current antitrust doctrine does not capture the full range of consumer 
harms.”60 More specifically, it claims that consumers are harmed by the 
inability to switch to platforms with more favorable content moderation 
policies.61 However, as described earlier, there can be many reasons other 
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than competitive dynamics for why the market lacks products or services 
with some desirable feature. The market absence of some specific suite of 
features cannot be grounds for a successful antitrust action.
EFF argues that the consumer welfare standard should be expanded 
to incorporate harms created by content moderation.62 But the harm they 
allege—diminished quality of moderation—could already be considered 
under the current consumer welfare standard. They admit that content mod-
eration is common and may be motivated by business need but assert that 
“large platforms tend to do it poorly.”63 This sounds like an argument con-
necting market power to reduced quality. Indeed, they propose quantifying 
censorship by focusing on how censorship “reduce[s] the service’s value to 
users, limiting the amount of expressive, communicative, and informational 
content they can access and share with each other (or excluding some users 
entirely).”64 This framing fits the existing consumer welfare approach. 
But their argument remains skeletal. As noted in the previous section, 
not every act of a large company that disadvantages some party is anticom-
petitive—nor should it be. It is insufficient to assert that poorly done content 
moderation reduces a service’s value. A persuasive case would have to 
demonstrate that a company exercised its market power to lower content 
moderation quality in a way that harmed consumers compared to modera-
tion in a competitive market.
Proposals to Politicize Antitrust Law Will Harm Free 
Speech Values—And Cause Collateral Damage to 
the Economy
Other proposals would more radically change antitrust law to address speech 
and other issues. Teachout and Khan, for example, would address platform 
political power by adopting “a general spirit” of antitrust that would allow 
the government to limit a company’s size and regulate market concentra-
tion, even if doing so would actually reduce consumer welfare.65 Relying on 
nonlegal definitions of monopoly they argue that the structure of corpora-
tions and markets are political questions that should be answered through 
political means. Specifically, they urge regulators to use antitrust to break 
up companies or limit their size in order to constrain their effect on politics, 
including on political speech. 
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This urge to use antitrust as a broad political tool is a core theme of 
populist and neo-Brandeisian antitrust reformers. Neo-Brandeisians argue 
that antitrust enforcement ought to expand beyond its traditional focus on 
consumer welfare and competition to address a wide range of policy prob-
lems, such as labor, inequality, political power, and, yes, free speech.66 They 
seek to use the powerful tools of antitrust as “meta-legislation” to achieve 
policy objectives.67 
Yet changing antitrust to a general-purpose tool to achieve a wide range 
of political objectives is a recipe for disaster. History amply demonstrates that 
politicians use antitrust for personal and political gain. Increasing the dis-
cretionary nature of antitrust would exacerbate such abuses. And, because 
it is a broadly applicable area of law, changing antitrust would bring such 
abuses, both private and public, upon a wide swath of the economy, not just 
technology platforms.
HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT UNCONSTRAINED 
ANTITRUST IS ABUSED BY GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE 
PARTIES, INCLUDING TO STIFLE SPEECH
Empowering antitrust authorities to incorporate goals other than promot-
ing the competitive process gives government a very powerful tool to use 
at their discretion. Government could abuse such a tool to directly or indi-
rectly coerce limits on speech to favor a certain view or to silence criticism 
of government itself. In the past, the U.S. government has demonstrated a 
propensity to do just this.
Critics of the consumer welfare standard see an increase in arbitrary 
action as a feature of their proposals. Teachout and Khan see returning to 
politicized antitrust as a positive. But in the area of the First Amendment, 
courts are often wary of laws that the government can enforce for any or no 
reason, because such laws place a pretext of legitimacy on otherwise illegiti-
mate government action. That is, laws that can be enforced whenever there is 
the political will to do so can be used to punish disfavored speech or speakers.
Would regulators seek to use antitrust law to coerce the treatment of 
social media content? As shown by examples discussed in this paper, many 
politicians calling to “break up big tech” hope that antitrust enforcement will 
change platforms’ content moderation practices. Given that many of those 
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demanding antitrust enforcement want to change how online platforms 
govern users’ expression, we should expect that regulators would likewise 
seek to use antitrust tools to shape online speech to match the views of the 
president, other politicians, or the regulators themselves. At the very least, 
the newly empowered regulators of social media platforms would face polit-
ical pressure to impose the changes in content moderation sought by those 
supporting these new powers.
In the past, political pressures have influenced antitrust enforcement in 
the United States. Since the formation of the antitrust laws, political actors 
have used antitrust regulators to shape investigations and enforcement 
actions to suit their own personal or political purposes.
Theodore Roosevelt, one of the earliest proponents of “trust-busting,” 
authorized a lawsuit against J.P. Morgan’s Northern Securities Trust, which 
controlled several railroads.68 However, Roosevelt left Morgan’s trusts that 
owned industrial assets untouched because he considered them “good trusts” 
that would cooperate with the government. Truman and Eisenhower took 
the opposite approach to antitrust enforcement in the oil industry, arguing 
that national security concerns negated any potential competition concerns 
and, in some cases, actively encouraged coordination between major oil 
firms.69 President Franklin D. Roosevelt reportedly used the threat of a full-
scale monopolization investigation of the motion picture industry to cajole 
industry leaders to meet with him in private, where he hoped they could be 
“straightened out.”70
The worst presidential abuses of antitrust authority, however, were by 
Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Each used antitrust enforcement to target 
media companies that threatened their political influence. President Johnson 
went after a newspaper, the Houston Chronicle, which had long criticized 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and had supported Nixon’s presi-
dential candidacy in 1960. After Johnson won reelection in 1964, he allegedly 
contacted the Chronicle’s publisher, who also happened to be the president 
of a bank with a merger before the Justice Department. Johnson told the pub-
lisher that merger approval would only be granted if the Chronicle agreed to 
support Johnson throughout his presidency.71 
Nixon similarly used the threat of antitrust enforcement to intimidate 
broadcast network executives at ABC, NBC, and CBS, the only three privately 
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owned television networks broadcasting nationally at the time, into pro-
viding better coverage of him and his administration. In fact, he preferred 
the threat of action over actually bringing a lawsuit, noting, “If the threat of 
screwing them is going to help us more with their programming than doing 
it, then keep the threat. ... Don’t screw them now. [Otherwise] they’ll figure 
that we’re done.”72 He asked the attorney general to not file an antitrust case 
against the networks but instead to “hold it for a while, because I’m trying to 
get something out of the networks.”73 One of his aides noted that “keeping 
this case in a pending status gives us one hell of a club ... something of a 
sword of Damocles.”74 Indeed, Nixon’s staff bragged that the threat of an 
antitrust action coerced NBC into airing a wedding special on the president’s 
daughter and CBS into listening to White House input on its stories.75 
The Nixon administration also settled an antitrust case against the 
International Telephone and Telegraph Company (a case Nixon had strongly 
opposed) after the company had allegedly donated $400,000 to Nixon’s 
reelection campaign.76
Abuse of antitrust laws has occurred even in administrations that sought 
to scale back antitrust enforcement. The Reagan administration staffed the 
antitrust division of the Department of Justice and the FTC with officials so 
supportive of Chicago School economics that the result was characterized as 
“an essentially laissez-faire approach in practically all areas of antitrust.”77 
Yet even that administration interfered with antitrust enforcement to suit 
the administration’s political desires. When the Justice Department began 
investigating potential collusion between airplane manufacturers and air-
lines, the Reagan administration ordered the agency to stop due to concerns 
that an investigation would make it more difficult to negotiate transatlantic 
airline fares with the United Kingdom.78 Reagan also personally provided 
input on antitrust cases involving telecommunications and steel compa-
nies, shaping decisions to the preferences of a politician rather than to the 
requirements of the law.79
However, as antitrust law became more grounded in economic evidence 
and argument, the ability of enforcers to apply it arbitrarily to achieve other 
political or speech-related goals became constrained. As a United States 
filing with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
explains,
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The U.S. Federal Trade Commission ... and the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) [] do not consider employment or other non-competi-
tion factors in their antitrust analysis. The antitrust agencies have learned that, 
while such considerations “may be appropriate policy objectives and worthy 
goals overall ... integrating their consideration into a competition analysis ... 
can lead to poor outcomes to the detriment of both businesses and consumers.” 
Instead, the antitrust agencies focus on ensuring robust competition that 
benefits consumers and leave other policies such as employment to other 
parts of government that may be specifically charged with or better placed to 
consider such objectives.80
In other words, the tools of antitrust are not the correct tools to implement 
even worthy noncompetition policies.
Still, current politicians remain inclined to use antitrust to address per-
sonal grievances with certain companies. As a presidential candidate, Donald 
Trump criticized CNN over its coverage of his 2016 presidential campaign 
and vowed to block the then-proposed merger between the outlet’s parent 
company and AT&T.81 After winning the election, President Trump continued 
to criticize the merger and the Department of Justice’s antitrust division filed 
a lawsuit to block the merger. Numerous individuals, including the CEO of 
AT&T, questioned whether the DOJ’s opposition to the merger was politically 
motivated.82 And as noted earlier,83 several sitting senators advocated for 
increased antitrust regulation of online platform companies because, they 
alleged, these firms discriminate against individuals with conservative beliefs. 
Relaxing the standards for antitrust action and broadening the scope of 
goals it seeks to achieve would roll back the clock in antitrust law, facilitating 
government abuse of antitrust law and providing a powerful tool for politicians, 
regulators, and enforcers who want to suppress disfavored speech or punish 
disfavored speakers. 
CHANGING ANTITRUST LAW WOULD HAVE COLLATERAL 
EFFECTS FAR BEYOND TECH
Because antitrust law applies to nearly all industries, changing antitrust law 
to address online speech concerns would affect the entire economy, including 
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many sectors that have nothing to do with free speech issues. Ditching the 
consumer welfare standard raises many concerns, as others have docu-
mented in detail.84 The mainstream consensus supports the consumer wel-
fare standard as the right tool for antitrust, even as there is vigorous debate 
about how to apply it. Abandoning that standard for the entire economy 
based on free speech concerns in one sector is a drastic solution. Even if one 
is less skeptical of the negative effects, it would still be prudent to target the 
practices and industries one is concerned about rather than changing laws 
that affect every industry.
Relaxing the standards for antitrust enforcement would also fuel more 
private antitrust litigation. Plaintiffs who win private antitrust suits can 
receive treble damages. Such suits can be brought by competing firms or 
harmed consumers, but can also be done in bad faith. Even under the current 
consumer welfare standard, companies often use private antitrust litiga-
tion as a “tool for harassing, harming and extorting payments from other 
firms.”85 Economists Preston McAfee and Nicholas Vakkur have documented 
seven different purposes for which companies have abused private antitrust 
litigation: 
• to extort funds from a successful rival; 
• to change the terms of a contract; 
• to punish noncooperative behavior; 
• to respond to an existing lawsuit; 
• to prevent a hostile takeover; 
• to discourage the entry of a rival; and 
• to prevent a successful firm from competing vigorously.86
Loosening the standards for alleging an antitrust violation or multiplying 
the types of harms that can be considered anticompetitive would affect the 
entire economy, giving politicians, companies, and individuals an even more 
powerful tool to abuse disfavored commercial rivals.
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Using Competition Policy to Regulate Speech Online 
Would Be More Targeted Than Antitrust But More 
Indirect Than Other Forms of Regulation
We will quickly mention a third category of competitive policy proposals. 
Such proposals are not antitrust, which relies on ex post enforcement to 
correct anticompetitive actions. In contrast, competition policy relies on leg-
islation to ex ante design an industry’s competitive structure. One example 
is Elizabeth Warren’s proposal for tech companies. She suggests classifying 
large technology companies as “platform utilities,” regulating company 
conduct, and requiring tech firms above a certain size threshold to divest 
themselves of certain businesses.87 She proposes doing so through new laws 
and regulations separate from antitrust law. Other proposals that fall in this 
category include the reportedly forthcoming White House executive order 
regarding political bias by social media platforms and the Digital Platform 
Act supported by certain advocacy groups.88 
Fully exploring the broad range of possible competition policies is 
outside the scope of this paper. However, two points are worth considering 
quickly. First, unlike changes to antitrust law, competition policy approaches 
can be more targeted. While problematic for many other reasons, such 
approaches can limit collateral effects better than sweeping changes to 
antitrust law. One key challenge for such proposals is to define boundaries 
between those intended to be subject to the laws and those not intended 
to be so affected in ways that cannot be gamed. Even so, they may create 
distortions between similarly situated companies, depending on which side 
of the line one falls.
Second, one problem with using competition policy to address free 
speech concerns is its indirectness. If one is already going to step outside 
the antitrust paradigm to pass laws and regulations, why not look for ways 
to directly regulate platforms to achieve the desired free speech goals? As 
discussed above, there are good reasons to think that increasing the number 
of competitors will not greatly increase the range of moderation practices. 
Setting specific rules could achieve the desired result. 
The answer to why competition policy rather than direct regulation 
may be as simple as the First Amendment. The First Amendment protects 
private parties—including the content choices of private social media 
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companies—against government interference. It would bar certain direct 
regulations of platform moderation practices. And even neutral competition 
policy approaches could run afoul of the First Amendment. The Supreme 
Court has “recognized that even a regulation neutral on its face may be 
content based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the 
message it conveys”89 or if it is discriminatory “in its practical operation.”90 
Many of those who seek to employ competition policy openly seek to do so 
because of and to alter the content of online expression. 
While competition policy can be more targeted than changes to antitrust 
law, it too can raise significant free speech concerns. These issues are worth 
further examination but will need to be done on a per-proposal basis.
CONCLUSION
Today we have more opportunities to speak to wider audiences and hear from more diverse voices than ever before. However, the same technological advances that have made that possible have also 
ignited new concerns about how those freedoms are used and who should 
regulate these new global speech forums. 
Many have proposed using antitrust law to address these speech-related 
concerns. But while antitrust is a powerful tool, it is not the right tool for this 
job. Current antitrust law imposes significant legal challenges to breaking up 
internet platforms based solely on speech concerns. Even if such companies 
could be broken up, many of the speech concerns we have discussed will 
not be resolved—and may even be exacerbated—by increases in the number 
of competitors. The history of antitrust and First Amendment law in the 
United States warns of the dangers and downsides of arbitrary exercises 
of broad antitrust power. An antitrust law powerful and flexible enough to 
stop harmful speech and eliminate bias on platforms is an antitrust law so 
overbearing and arbitrary that it could be used to limit speech. We should 
look elsewhere to address our concerns about speech online.
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